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A DEFENSE OF JAPANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE
SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS
RYAN M. SCOVILLE*

Legal analyses on the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands have been unfavorable to Japan. The literature is
populated primarily with works by commentators who either argue
in favor of the Chinese claim1 or conclude that the applicable law
is simply too indeterminate to support either party.2 Analyses supporting the Japanese position are rare and call for further explication.3 This is a surprising state of affairs, given that Japan has the
better argument. This Article explains why. Part I simplifies the
sovereignty debate by identifying a number of commonly raised
issues that are immaterial as a matter of law. Part II organizes the
debate by identifying and evaluating the legal questions that matter: (1) whether the Islands were unoccupied territory when Japan
annexed them in 1895, (2) whether Japan ever acquired title
under the doctrine of acquisitive prescription, and (3) whether the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. J.D., 2006, Stanford
Law School; B.A., 2003, Brigham Young University. For helpful feedback on earlier drafts,
thanks to participants at the University of Illinois Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies’s symposium on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, participants at the Mid-American Jesuit
Faculty Workshop at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, Ray Christensen, and
Michael O’Hear.
1. See, e.g., Han-yi Shaw, Revisiting the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Examining
Legal Claims and New Historical Evidence Under International Law and the Traditional East Asian
World Order, 26 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 95, 156 (2008); Hungdah Chiu, An
Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over T’iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku Gunto), 15 CHINESE (TAIWAN)
Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 9, 19–21 (1996); Victor H. Li, China and Off-Shore Oil: The Tiao-yü Tai
Dispute, 10 STAN. J. INT’L STUD. 143, 150–51 (1975); see also Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese
Dispute over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition, 14 VA. J.
INT’L L. 221, 262–63 (1974) (implying that China has a stronger claim).
2. See, e.g., Chi Manjiao, The Unhelpfulness of Treaty Law in Solving the Sino-Japan Sovereign Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, 6 U. PA. E. ASIA L. REV. 163, 187–88 (2011); see also
Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands, 29 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 903, 937–40 (2008) (explaining how legal indeterminacy complicates the task of
achieving a resolution).
3. Reinhard Drifte, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and
China: Between the Materialization of the “China Threat” and Japan “Reversing the Outcome of
World War II”?, UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS, May 2013, at 9, 58; William B. Heflin, Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands Dispute: Japan and China, Oceans Apart, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 18 (2000);
Seokwoo Lee, Territorial Disputes Among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku
Islands, 3 BOUNDARY & TERRITORY BRIEFING, no. 7, 2002, at 1.
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Allies made a lawful determination in favor of Japanese title after
World War II in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and
Instrument of Surrender. Part III explains that Japan likely has
sovereignty due to the doctrine of acquisitive prescription, which is
no more indeterminate than the doctrine of occupation on which
China relies, and which trumps China’s original occupation as a
later-in-time source of title. Pre-war acquisitive prescription from
1895 to 1937 confirms that the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations
did not transfer sovereignty to China and establishes that the 1951
San Francisco Peace Treaty’s allocation of sovereignty to Japan was
lawful. Post-war acquisitive prescription from 1951 to 1970 forms a
second, freestanding basis for the Japanese claim.
I.

RED HERRING

IN THE

EAST CHINA SEA

At the center of the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is
the question of sovereignty: to which state do the Islands belong?
Because the parties have collected a range of historical evidence,
relied upon a variety of treaties and official declarations, and
asserted multiple alternative theories of title, the question has an
air of complexity. Upon close inspection, however, many of the
common arguments are legally irrelevant. This Part simplifies the
dispute by identifying and clearing away the clutter of issues that
cannot affect title to the Islands.
A.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki

Signed at the conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese War in April
1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki provided in part that China
“cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty . . . [t]he island
of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to
the said Island of Formosa.”4 The parties disagree on whether this
language encompassed the Senkaku/Diaoyu. Under the Japanese
view, the language did not, the Treaty is inapplicable, and sovereignty hinges on other issues.5 Under the Chinese view, the Treaty
transferred sovereignty over the Islands to Japan, and China reacquired sovereignty through the Treaty’s subsequent invalidation.6
To support the latter part of this argument, the Republic of China
4. Treaty of Peace, China-Japan, art. 2(b), Apr. 17, 1895, 181 Consol. TS 217.
5. The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF.
JAPAN (May 8, 2013), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html.
6. State Council Info. Office of China, Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China,
AMBASSADE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE DE CHINE AU MAROC (Oct. 23, 2012), http://
ma.china-embassy.org/fra/xwdt/t981801.htm.
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(ROC or Taiwan) relies upon the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty of 1952
(Treaty of Taipei), in which the parties “recognize[d] that all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before December 9,
1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as a
consequence of [World War II].”7 According to Taiwan, this language invalidated the Treaty of Shimonoseki and in doing so
reversed the original cession to Japan.8 The People’s Republic of
China (PRC) makes a similar argument based on China’s 1941 declaration of war, which stated, “all treaties, conventions, agreements,
and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan are
and remain null and void.”9 The PRC further asserts that the
Treaty of Shimonoseki was of no effect because Japan achieved its
terms through military conquest.10 In short, the Chinese contention is that China gave sovereignty to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki and either Japan gave it back in the Treaty of Taipei,
Shimonoseki was invalid to begin with, or China unilaterally nullified the original transfer in 1941. Ultimately, the Chinese arguments are unpersuasive because they do not comport with
Shimonoseki’s text, context, or drafting history. Thus, neither that
treaty, the 1941 declaration, nor the Treaty of Taipei matters.
The analysis begins with several background points. First,
“appertain” does not appear to carry a meaning materially different from “belong.” Common usage suggests that they are functionally identical,11 and the Treaty of Shimonoseki lacks any
definitional provisions to suggest non-ordinary meaning. Second,
to “appertain[ ] or belong[ ]” holds a natural geographic, rather
than a political, orientation. The text supports this view by including within the cession of territory all islands that appertain or
belong to the “Island of Formosa,”12 rather than, for example, the
“Province of Taiwan.” If the Treaty had used the latter phrasing,
one might reasonably determine the amount of territory ceded by
looking simply to the boundaries of the province in 1895 and concluding that the Treaty transferred to Japan only those islands
7. Treaty of Peace, Taiwan-Japan, art. 4, Apr. 28, 1952, 138 U.N.T.S. 3.
8. Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan, The Diaoyutai Islands: An Inherent Part of the
Territory of the Republic of China (Taiwan), MAR. INFO. SERVICE CENTER (Apr. 9, 2012), http://
maritimeinfo.moi.gov.tw/marineweb/LayFromE0.aspx?icase=TO2&pid=0000000516.
9. China’s Declaration of War on Japan, Dec. 9, 1941, reprinted in CHINA AND THE
QUESTION OF TAIWAN: DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 204 (Hungdah Chiu ed., 1973).
10. State Council Info. Office of China, supra note 6.
11. Appertain, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9625?
(last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (“To belong as parts to the whole, or as members to a family or
class, and hence, to the head of the family; to be related, akin to.”).
12. Treaty of Peace, China-Japan, supra note 4, art. 2(b).
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belonging to the same political unit. By focusing instead on natural geography, the text suggests a different analysis that hinges on
the physical relationship between Formosa and any surrounding
islands. A separate provision in the Treaty confirms this reading by
requiring China to cede “all islands appertaining or belonging to
the Province of Fêng-Tien.”13 If the Treaty of Shimonoseki is to
mean what it says, one must assume that the use of natural geographic terminology with respect to Formosa, together with political terminology elsewhere, was purposeful. Finally, the only
plausible criteria for determining the natural geographic relationship between islands are distance and seabed topography. Of
these, the first seems more likely, given the extremely limited state
of knowledge about seabed topography in the late nineteenth
century.14
There are several conceivable ways of applying the distance and
topography criteria. For distance, one method would hold that an
island or island group appertains or belongs to Formosa only if it is
closer to Formosa than to any other land features, however minor
in size. Another would hold that an island or island group appertains or belongs to Formosa as long as it is closer to Formosa than
to either of the other major land features in the region: the island
of Okinawa and the Chinese mainland. Yet another would hold
that islands appertain or belong to Formosa only if they are within
a fixed distance of its shoreline—100 nautical miles, for example. I
will call these the all-features, major-features, and absolute-distance tests,
respectively. For seabed topography, one possibility would maintain that islands appertain or belong to Formosa if they share the
same continental shelf. Another would maintain instead that
islands must come from the same rise out of the continental shelf
as Formosa. These are the continental-shelf and seafloor-rise tests.
Given these options, Japan has the stronger position in arguing
that the Treaty of Shimonoseki did not transfer sovereignty over
the Senkaku/Diaoyu. First, the Islands do not even arguably
13. Id. art. 2(a) (emphasis added).
14. See ROBERT KUNZIG, MAPPING THE DEEP: THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF OCEAN SCIENCE 32–39 (2000). In theory, one might also define the physical relationship between
islands according to marine geology or geomorphology, but it seems implausible that the
drafters of the Treaty of Shimonoseki envisioned either approach, given that neither of
these fields appears to have produced information about the East China Sea by 1895. Cf.
David R. Oldroyd & Rodney H. Grapes, Contributions to the History of Geomorphology and Quaternary Geology: An Introduction, in HISTORY OF GEOMORPHOLOGY AND QUATERNARY GEOLOGY
1, 39 (Geological Soc’y, Special Publ’n No. 301, R.H. Grapes et al. eds., 2008) (summarizing the history of the discipline).
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appertain or belong to Formosa under two of the possible
approaches. Under the all-features test, the Islands would fall
outside the scope of the Treaty because they are approximately ten
nautical miles closer to the Japanese islands of Ishigaki and Iriomote than to Formosa (see Figure 1).15 Likewise, under the
seafloor-rise test, the Islands are beyond the scope of the Treaty
because their only topographical commonality with Formosa is
their location on China’s continental shelf.16
ALL FEATURES TEST (FIGURE 1)

Second, all of the metrics under which the Islands would appertain or belong to Formosa are overinclusive. Under the major-features test, the Treaty would have transferred sovereignty over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu because they are substantially closer to Formosa
than to the other major land features in the area (see Figure 2).17
Yet parts of the Yaeyama Islands, such as Iriomote and Yonaguni,
are also closer to Formosa than to the other major alternatives and
were undisputedly Japanese territory well before Shimonoseki
15. See Distance Measurement Tool, GOOGLE, https://maps.google.com/maps?
t=m&ll=38.892553,-77.0526715&z=14&output=classic&dg=opt (click Maps Labs hyperlink;
select Enable to turn on Distance Measurement Tool; click ruler icon; follow I’m Feeling
Geeky hyperlink to select nautical miles) (last visited Mar. 16, 2014).
16. See GENERAL BATHYMETRIC CHART OF THE OCEANS (GEBCO), WORLD MAP (2014),
available at http://www.gebco.net/data_and_products/gebco_world_map/documents/
gebco_map_2013.pdf.
17. The distance to Formosa is about 90 nautical miles, while the distances to the
island of Okinawa and the Chinese mainland are approximately 225 and 194 nautical
miles, respectively. Distance Measurement Tool, supra note 15.

R
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MAJOR FEATURES TEST: SENKAKU/DIAOYU (FIGURE 2)

(see Figures 3 and 4).18 Thus, relative proximity to Formosa cannot be determinative. Similarly, under the absolute-distance test,
the Treaty would have transferred sovereignty over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu if the text encompassed all islands at least as far from Formosa as Kubajima/Huangwei Yu, which is the northernmost part
of the Senkaku/Diaoyu group and about 106 nautical miles away.19
But that approach would also encompass parts of the Yaeyama
Islands.20 Yonaguni, for instance, is only fifty-nine nautical miles
from Formosa (see Figure 5).21 Thus, for one of these approaches
to reflect the meaning of the Treaty, the Qing Dynasty must have
either purported to cede a number of islands over which it clearly
had no sovereignty to begin with, or agreed upon an exception for
Japanese islands that appertained or belonged to Formosa under
the intended meaning of those terms. The former scenario is
implausible, and there is no textual evidence of the latter.22 If distance is the criterion, the only way to avoid the problem of overinclusiveness is to adopt an interpretation under which no part of the
Yaeyama Islands appertains or belongs to Formosa. Such an interpretation will necessarily exclude the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
18. Id.; see Gavan McCormack, Yonaguni: Dilemmas of a Frontier Island in the East China
Sea, ASIA-PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS (Oct. 1, 2012), http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/
3837 (explaining that Japan incorporated the Yaeyama Islands into the modern Japanese
State in 1879).
19. Distance Measurement Tool, supra note 15.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See generally Treaty of Peace, China-Japan, supra note 4.

R
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MAJOR FEATURES TEST: IRIOMOTE (FIGURE 3)

MAJOR FEATURES TEST: YONAGUNI (FIGURE 4)

The continental-shelf test also would be overinclusive, but in a
different way. Taken to its logical conclusion, that approach would
mean that the Treaty accomplished, with modest language, the
transfer of sovereignty over not just the Senkaku/Diaoyu but all
other small islands on the entire continental shelf, including
numerous islands immediately off the coast of mainland China,
regardless of distance from Formosa. This territory would include
everything from the island of Beishi, near Hainan; to the Pratas
Islands; a swath of islands in Fujian Province; and a series of islands
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ABSOLUTE DISTANCE TEST (FIGURE 5)

near Shanghai, among numerous others.23 Yet no one acted as if
such transfers occurred.24 That they did not suggests that this test
fails to reflect the intended meaning of the text.
Also problematic is that the Chinese position renders redundant
a separate Treaty provision that transferred sovereignty over the
Pescadores Islands. At twenty-four nautical miles west of Formosa,
the Pescadores are substantially closer to Formosa than the
Senkaku/Diaoyu, much closer to Formosa than either the island of
Okinawa or the Chinese mainland, and on the same continental
shelf as Formosa (see Figure 6).25 Given this geography, the Pescadores appertain or belong to Formosa under all of the tests that
would include the Senkaku/Diaoyu in the ceded territory. And yet
the drafters found it necessary to transfer the Pescadores explicitly
and in an entirely separate provision.26 This might suggest that the
parties did not envision any of the relatively expansive tests. Put
differently, the only way to avoid rendering the language on the
Pescadores redundant is to interpret “islands appertaining or
belonging to the . . . Island of Formosa”27 as referring exclusively to
islands that are closer to Formosa than the Pescadores or that share
23. GEBCO, supra note 16.
24. See MUTSU MUNEMITSU, KENKENROKU: A DIPLOMATIC RECORD OF THE SINO-JAPANESE
WAR, 1894–95, at 164–255 (Gordon Mark Berger ed. & trans., The Japan Found. 1982)
(1923) (providing a first-hand account of the treaty negotiations and subsequent “triple
intervention” by Russia, Germany, and France).
25. Distance Measurement Tool, supra note 15; GEBCO, supra note 16.
26. Treaty of Peace, China-Japan, supra note 4, art. 2(c).
27. Id. art. 2(b).

R
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THE PESCADORES (FIGURE 6)

a topographical relationship greater than location on the same
continental shelf. Once again, those interpretations necessarily
exclude the Senkaku/Diaoyu.
Finally, the Chinese position is less persuasive because of chronology: Japan unilaterally annexed the Islands in January 1895,
over three months before the parties signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki.28 Given that act, it is questionable that Japan understood
the Treaty as the source of its sovereignty. To negotiate for the
transfer of the Islands only months after annexing them would
have been bizarre; the Japanese government would have had to
believe that its own action was an insufficient basis for title or otherwise problematic. I am not aware of any evidence that it did.29
28. Koji Taira, The China-Japan Clash over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, ASIAN AFF., no. 23,
2004, at 5, 6, available at http://www.asian-affairs.com/Resources/AA23.pdf.
29. Shaw interprets certain historical records as demonstrating that high-level Japanese officials postponed incorporation from 1885 until the end of the Sino-Japanese war
because the officials “recognized the islands’ Chinese ownership under the traditional East
Asian World Order.” Han-yi Shaw, supra note 1, at 114. I disagree with that interpretation.
If anything, the records show precisely the opposite. They reflect, for example, an official
Japanese understanding that “there [were] no traces of evidence that the islands belong to
China,” that the Islands were “under no specific jurisdiction” prior to incorporation, and
that Okinawans had frequently visited the Islands before 1895 and used non-Chinese
names for them “since ancient times.” Id. at 115–16, 120, 122. The best evidence in favor
of Shaw’s interpretation is a letter in which the Japanese Foreign Minister explained his
opposition to an October 1885 proposal for placing markers on the Islands. In relevant
part, the letter stated:
Most recently, Chinese newspapers have been reporting rumors of our government’s intention of occupying certain islands belonging to China located next to
Taiwan, demonstrating suspicion toward our country and consistently urging the
Qing government to be aware of this matter. At this time, if we were to publicly

R
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I do not mean to suggest that these arguments are entirely conclusive. China might challenge them in two ways. First, while the
Chinese position renders the provision on the Pescadores redundant, it does not necessarily render it superfluous. Because of their
strategic location and harbor, regional powers historically viewed
the Pescadores as key to the capture of Formosa, and the Pescadores played an important role in the First Sino-Japanese War.30 It is
possible, therefore, that Japan demanded a separate provision on
those islands simply out of an abundance of caution. In other
words, the negotiating parties may have understood that the language regarding Formosa was broad enough to encompass the Pescadores but added the separate provision to make the transfer of
sovereignty over them indisputably clear.
Second, the chronology argument presupposes that it is permissible to consider context in ascertaining the meaning of the text.
There is no authority, however, on how to interpret the Treaty.
While modern international law supplies codified rules of interpretation,31 that law entered into force in 1980 and is nonretroactive,32
and the customary practices that the modern rules codified had
not yet developed in the late nineteenth century.33 The result is
that there is no clear legal basis for considering context as an indicator of meaning or for following any other rule of interpretation,
and meaning necessarily remains somewhat unsettled.
place national markers on the islands, this must necessarily invite China’s suspicion toward us.
Id. at 117. Read alone, it is not out of the question that this statement reflected an official
understanding in favor of Chinese title. But that is far from the only possible reading, and
it is not even the best one. The Foreign Minister described the Islands as “belonging to
China,” but it is most sensible to interpret that description as, in effect, a quotation of the
Chinese media rather than a reflection of the Japanese view. See id. The reason for the
Foreign Minister’s caution was not a belief in Chinese sovereignty but reluctance to further
complicate any already strained bilateral relationship with new evidence of Japanese
expansionism. This conclusion best aligns with the series of contemporaneous statements
in which Japanese officials explicitly described the territory as terra nullius, id. at 115–16,
120, 122, and with the broader historical context, which included tension over Taiwan, the
Ryukyu Islands, and Korea. See Katherine G. Burns, China and Japan: Economic Partnership to
Political Ends, in ECONOMIC CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND REGIONAL SECURITY 27, 31 (Report
No. 36) (Michael Krepon & Chris Gagné eds., 2000), available at: http://www.stimson.org/
images/uploads/research-pdfs/burnspdf.pdf.
30. JAMES W. DAVIDSON, THE ISLAND OF FORMOSA, PAST AND PRESENT: HISTORY, PEOPLE,
RESOURCES AND COMMERCIAL PROSPECTS 266–68 (1903).
31. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–33, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
32. Id. art. 4.
33. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 582 (2d ed. 1912).
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Neither of these challenges, however, seems to do more than
keep the Chinese position on life support. While an expansive
interpretation of the Formosa provision might not make the provision on the Pescadores superfluous, China’s position does not
enjoy any affirmative textual support. The Treaty, after all, never
says a word about the Senkaku/Diaoyu and there is no evidence
that the parties discussed the Islands during negotiations.34 Moreover, just as there is no applicable rule of treaty interpretation that
permits reliance upon context, neither is there a rule against it. All
of this is important because international tribunals have declined
in several cases to rule on the basis of a treaty that did not clearly
apply to a disputed territory. Examples of this practice occurred in
The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. United Kingdom)35 and Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia).36 The foregoing
analysis suggests that an international court would do the same
with the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
In summary, only relatively restrictive interpretations of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki can avoid the problems of overinclusiveness, redundancy, and chronology. One such interpretation is a
limited version of the absolute-distance test, which would hold that
islands appertain or belong to Formosa only if they are closer to
Formosa than the Pescadores are. Islands that satisfy this requirement include Keelung, Green, Guishan, and Lamay, all of which
are within approximately twenty nautical miles of Formosa’s shoreline (see Figure 7).37 The other remaining interpretation is that
islands appertain or belong to Formosa only if they rise together
with Formosa out of the continental shelf. Because both of these
easily exclude the Senkaku/Diaoyu, the Treaty is irrelevant to the
sovereignty debate. This in turn means that the 1941 declaration
of war and the 1952 Treaty of Taipei are also irrelevant; if the
Treaty of Shimonoseki did not transfer sovereignty over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to Japan, neither of the other documents
could have transferred sovereignty back to China by invalidating
Shimonoseki.

34. See MUNEMITSU, supra note 24 at 164–202 (providing a first-hand account of the
negotiations).
35. Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 54 (Nov. 17).
36. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), 2012 I.C.J. 624, paras. 40–56
(Nov. 19).
37. Distance Measurement Tool, supra note 15.
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MINOR ISLANDS (FIGURE 7)

B.

Geography

Some assert that the location of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
favors Chinese sovereignty. The Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior, for example, cites as supporting evidence the Islands’ location
on China’s continental shelf, where they are easy to reach from
Taiwan because of favorable air and water currents.38 However,
international law is clear that location per se is inconsequential.39
In the Island of Palmas Case, the Permanent Court of Arbitration
explained, “it is impossible to show the existence of a rule of positive international law to the effect that islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a State from the mere fact that its
territory forms the terra firma (nearest continent or island of considerable size).”40 Not only would such a rule be “wholly lacking in
precision,” its application would “lead to arbitrary results” and contradict well-established doctrines that emphasize effective control
as a critical determinant of title.41 The result is that the location of
the Islands on China’s continental shelf, in comparative proximity
to the Chinese mainland, is in itself insignificant.

38. Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan, supra note 8.
39. See MONIQUE CHEMILLIER-GENDREAU, SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PARACEL AND SPRATLY
ISLANDS 27–29 (H.L. Sutcliffe & M. McDonald trans., Kluwer Law Int’l 2000) (1996).
40. Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 854 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
41. Id. at 854–55.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\J\JLE\46-3\JLE303.txt

2014]

unknown

Seq: 13

Japanese Sovereignty over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

C.

20-NOV-14

13:53

583

Acts of Private Individuals

Commentators and official state publications also have pointed
to the conduct of private individuals as evidence of sovereignty.
The Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior emphasizes that the
Senkaku/Diaoyu were “popular among [Chinese] fishermen who
sought shelter on the[ ] islands during storms and repaired boats
and equipment on their shores” and that the Chinese also used the
Islands as a place to gather medicinal herbs and dismantle salvaged
boats.42 Other publications discuss how Japanese citizens built a
lighthouse on the Islands in the 1980s.43 Yet such acts are generally irrelevant. In The Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan
and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), for example, Indonesia
argued that the traditional use of waters surrounding certain disputed islands by Indonesian fishermen supported its claim to sovereignty,44 but the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected that
argument and explained that the “activities by private persons cannot be seen as [evidence of sovereignty] if they do not take place
on the basis of official regulations or under governmental authority.”45 The basic contours of this rule have been in place since at
least the nineteenth century.46
D.

Most Official Acts After 1970

Most of the official conduct by the Japanese and Chinese governments over the last forty-five years is also immaterial to the analysis.
Once a sovereignty dispute crystallizes, a development marked by
the so-called “critical date,” the law discounts the relevance of all
subsequent acts that either party undertakes to improve its legal
position.47 The goal of this doctrine is twofold. First, it aims to
42. Ministry of the Interior of Taiwan, supra note 8.
43. See Hirose Hajime, Japan’s Effective Control of the Senkaku Islands, REV. ISLAND STUD.
21 (June 10, 2013), http://islandstudies.oprf-info.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/
a00005.pdf.
44. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), 2002 I.C.J.
625, para. 140 (Dec. 17).
45. Id.; see also Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in
the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), 2007 I.C.J. 661, 717 (Oct. 8) (quoting Sovereignty over
Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045,
1103–06 (Dec. 13) (applying similar “private person” analysis in a dispute between Botswana and Namibia).
46. See 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 198 (1854).
47. R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 28–33
(1963). For examples of the application of this doctrine, see Territorial and Maritime Dispute
Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, 2007 I.C.J. at 697–98; Sovereignty over
Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, 2002 I.C.J. at 692; Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.),
1953 I.C.J. 47, 59–60 (Nov. 17).
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reduce the risk of military or other conflicts that might arise from
simultaneous acts of sovereignty by the competing parties.48 By
deeming most subsequent acts irrelevant, the law reduces the
incentive for a party to disturb the status quo. Second, the doctrine aims to protect the quality of the evidence on which sovereignty may depend by eliminating the incentive for parties to
create new facts in support of their claims once a dispute has
arisen.49 Underlying this particular goal is the assumption that official acts that occur prior to the crystallization of a dispute are more
genuine indicia of sovereignty or its absence because parties undertake such acts without an eye toward the response of other parties
or international tribunals.
For the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu, the most likely critical
date is approximately 1970, shortly after the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East reported a high probability of
massive deposits of oil and natural gas underneath the waters surrounding the Islands.50 This is the point at which the parties
understood the economic stakes of sovereignty and began to assert
competing claims. In July 1970, the Japanese Ambassador to Taiwan communicated Japan’s claim to the PRC,51 and in December
1970, Taiwan declared the Islands to be Chinese territory.52 As a
result, the overwhelming majority of official acts that have
occurred in the decades since are inconsequential. It is generally
of no moment, for example, that the Japanese government purchased some of the Islands in 2012,53 that Chinese vessels have vis-

48. Cf. L.F.E. Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1251, 1253 (1968)
(“‘[O]ne object of the critical date is to prevent one of the parties from unilaterally
improving its position by means of some step taken after the issue has been definitely
joined.’”) (quoting Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice, 1951–4: Points of Substantive Law. Part II, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 20, 24–25 (1955–56)).
49. W. Michael Reisman, The Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the
Republic of Yemen: Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings (Territorial
Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute), 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 668, 678 (1999).
50. See COMM. FOR CO-ORDINATION OF JOINT PROSPECTING FOR MINERAL RES. IN ASIAN
OFFSHORE AREAS, TECH. BULL. VOL. 2, GEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE AND SOME WATER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EAST CHINA SEA AND THE YELLOW SEA 39–41 (1969).
51. Han-yi Shaw, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the
Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan, 152 OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINT SERIES IN
CONTEMPOR. ASIAN STUD., no. 3, 1999, at 2, 11.
52. LINUS HAGSTRÖM, JAPAN’S CHINA POLICY: A RELATIONAL POWER ANALYSIS 120
(2005); see also Lee, supra note 3, at 6.
53. Julian Ryall, Japan Agrees to Buy Disputed Senkaku Islands, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 5, 2012,
7:26 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/9521793/Japanagrees-to-buy-disputed-Senkaku-islands.html.
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ited the surrounding waters with frequency in recent years,54 or
even that the United States supported Japanese sovereignty in 1971
by signing the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.55 At most, such acts
demonstrate only that neither party has acquiesced in the sovereignty claim of the other; they cannot support title as evidence of
effective control.
Some have suggested instead that the critical date is 1895, when
Japan both annexed the Islands and allegedly acquired them from
China through the Treaty of Shimonoseki.56 This view rests on the
assumption that the critical date is the point at which one state
begins to act in any way inconsistent with the title of another.57
The law, however, does not support that assumption.58 International tribunals have explained that the critical date is the point at
which the parties contest title.59 Under this precedent, 1895 cannot be the critical date because no contest occurred if China ceded
the Islands to Japan, and I am aware of no evidence of a Chinese
objection to Japanese annexation and control in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century.60 Finally, a critical date of 1895
would operate in tension with the doctrine of acquisitive prescription, which holds that one state can obtain title over part of the
territory of another by asserting effective control in a peaceful and
public manner, without interruption, for a sufficient period.61 If
the first attempt to exercise control over another state’s territory
marked the critical date, acquisitive prescription would become virtually impossible because the law would bar consideration of nearly
54. Eight Chinese Vessels Enter Senkaku Area, JAPAN TIMES, (Apr. 24, 2013), http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/24/national/eight-chinese-vessels-enter-senkakuarea.
55. Reversion to Japan of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands, U.S-Japan, art. 1.1, June 17,
1971, 23 U.S.T. 446, 841 U.N.T.S 275.
56. Han-yi Shaw, supra note 1, at 156.
57. See id.
58. See Goldie, supra note 48, at 1255 (explaining that the critical date occurs “when
both parties to a legal dispute submit distinct sets of facts and series of events, and distinct
theories of the case for the characterisation or definition of the issues”).
59. See, e.g., Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), 2002
I.C.J. 625, para. 135 (Dec. 17) (explaining that the critical date is the “date on which the
dispute between the Parties crystallized”); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), 1999
I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13); Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 59 (Nov. 17)
(rejecting a suggested critical date because “no dispute as to . . . sovereignty . . . had yet
arisen” at that point).
60. Indeed, the evidence suggests precisely the opposite. See infra text accompanying
notes 76–77, 113–18.
61. JENNINGS, supra note 47, at 20–23; D.H.N. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 332, 344–47 (1950).
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all evidence of the acquiring state’s effective control.62 That international law generally recognizes such evidence demonstrates that
an attempt to establish effective control does not itself set the critical date.
II.

THREE KEY QUESTIONS

Part I identified commonly discussed topics that do not matter.
This Part argues that there are only three issues on which sovereignty depends: (1) whether the Islands were unoccupied terra nullius when Japan annexed them in 1895; (2) whether Japan ever
acquired title under the doctrine of acquisitive prescription; and
(3) whether the Allies made a lawful determination in favor of Japanese title after World War II in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and Instrument of Surrender.
A.

Whether the Islands Were Terra Nullius in 1895

The first critical part of the sovereignty debate concerns the status of the Islands at the time of Japanese annexation in 1895. Relying upon a variety of historical evidence, China contends that the
Islands were Chinese territory in 1895 and had been for centuries.63 Japan responds that the Islands were unoccupied territory,
or “terra nullius,” as revealed by official surveys prior to annexation.64 For China, title in 1895 is a prerequisite to a valid claim
today; if the Islands were terra nullius, there is no plausible theory
under which the Islands can now belong to China. If the Islands
were Chinese, however, Japan might still have valid title today if
China subsequently acquiesced to Japan’s effective control in
accordance with the doctrine of acquisitive prescription, as discussed below in Section B.
Whether the Islands were terra nullius depends upon the doctrines of occupation and intertemporality. The former holds that a
state can appropriate unclaimed territory by occupying and possessing it.65 The latter holds that one must judge the legality of
events in light of the law contemporaneous with their occurrence,
rather than with the law in force at the time the dispute is ultimately resolved.66 In other words, lawful annexation by Japan
requires that China had not already engaged in acts sufficient to
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See Fitzmaurice, supra note 48, at 32, 34.
State Council Info. Office of China, supra note 6.
The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, supra note 5.
JENNINGS, supra note 47, at 20.
See Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 845. (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
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appropriate the Islands under the law of occupation that existed
up to 1895.
Given these rules, China likely possessed original sovereignty
over the Islands from the fourteenth to at least the eighteenth century. Early international law held that discovery could form the
basis for occupation,67 and the earliest historical records appear to
point exclusively to discovery by China. From 1372 to the mid1800s, for example, Chinese emperors sent over twenty investiture
missions to Okinawa to confer titles of authority on successive rulers of the Ryukyu Islands, and notes from some of those missions
reportedly suggest a Chinese understanding that the Senkaku/
Diaoyu were Chinese territory.68 Moreover, there appears to be an
absence of competing evidence of earlier discovery by Japan.69 In
addition, even if it is anachronistic to apply European legal doctrines to conduct in East Asia during this period, East Asia’s Sinocentric order likely favored Chinese authority over proximate lands
not claimed by other regimes.70
The harder question, however, is whether China lost sovereignty
in the nineteenth century, once the law evolved from supporting
occupation by discovery to supporting occupation only upon effective possession and administration.71 The new doctrine prioritized
the quality and volume of sovereign acts—or “effectivités”—undertaken with respect to a territory and posited that the holder of original title could lose sovereignty by failing to maintain effective
control.72 As an example of this law, one nineteenth century treatise noted that while the Dutch were the first Europeans to discover
and name New Zealand, Tasmania, and eastern Australia, they also
“allowed long years to pass away without forming settlements or
making any effective occupation” of those lands, which enabled
England to acquire title later through effective occupation.73 Simi67. OPPENHEIM, supra note 33, at 294; see also Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 846
(explaining that discovery alone has been an inadequate basis for sovereignty “since the
19th century”).
68. Han-yi Shaw, supra note 1, at 104; see also UNRYU SUGANUMA, SOVEREIGN RIGHTS
AND TERRITORIAL SPACE IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 42–87 (2000) (describing historical
documents that show early Chinese contacts with the islands).
69. See SUGANUMA, supra note 68, at 87–100 (describing the earliest Japanese contacts
with the islands).
70. See John K. Fairbank, A Preliminary Framework, in THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER 1,
8–10 (John K. Fairbank ed., 1968); see also SUGANUMA, supra note 68, at 111 (arguing that
even Japan accepted the Sino-centric world order during the Ming Empire).
71. See generally OPPENHEIM, supra note 33, at 292–94.
72. See PHILLIMORE, supra note 46, at 201–02.
73. EDWARD SHEPHERD CREASY, FIRST PLATFORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 216 (1876).
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larly, in the famous Island of Palmas Case, the arbitrator held that
while Spain may have acquired original title through discovery in
the sixteenth century, Spain failed to develop an effective occupation once the law evolved to require more than discovery and thus
lost its claim.74 This failure enabled the Netherlands to acquire
sovereignty later through effective occupation.75
For Japan, the best argument seems to be that China lost its original title by failing to update its conduct to occupy the Islands
within the meaning of the new doctrine.76 On this reasoning, prenineteenth century acts by China are generally beside the point,
and acts of possession and administration in the decades leading
up to 1895 were insufficient. An apparent paucity of Chinese effectivités in the nineteenth century supports this view. For example,
an official PRC White Paper on the dispute mentions only an investiture mission that sailed by the Islands en route to Okinawa in
1866, an official gazetteer from 1871 that referenced the Islands,
and a series of five maps, four of which were not official publications.77 Scholars have also found little evidence of Chinese control.78 Effectivités that modern international tribunals have found
sufficient to establish sovereignty by occupation generally have
been more substantial in quality and volume. In the Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland, the Permanent Court of International Justice
concluded that Denmark had effectively occupied certain terra nullius by: (1) entering into a series of international conventions that
implied a Danish power to govern the territory; (2) granting exclusive rights for trading, hunting, mining, and the erection of telegraph lines on the land; and (3) passing legislation that fixed limits
on surrounding territorial waters.79 Recent cases analyzing effective control over disputed islands also have involved more substantial governmental acts. In the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, the ICJ held that Malaysia possessed sov74. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 844–46, 850–52, 855–56. (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1928).
75. Id. at 867.
76. Cf. JOHN O’BRIEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 208 (2001) (explaining that territory may
be terra nullius “either because there was no sovereign or because of abandonment by the
previous sovereign”); CREASY, supra note 73, at 216 (“When the Discoverers of a new country take no measures to perfect their title by use and occupation, the country becomes
derelict; and the members of another state may occupy it, and may acquire lawful possession and property.”).
77. State Council Info. Office of China, supra note 6.
78. GREG AUSTIN, CHINA’S OCEAN FRONTIER 164–67 (1998).
79. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53,
at 35–36 (Apr. 5).
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ereignty because it had issued licenses for and settled disputes pertaining to the collection of turtle eggs, established a bird sanctuary
pursuant to an official land ordinance, and constructed an official
lighthouse on the islands.80 In the Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia), the ICJ held that Colombia possessed sovereignty because its government had passed laws regulating the
extraction of guano and collection of coconuts, inspected and
maintained lighthouses, dispatched law enforcement, and conducted several search and rescue operations on the islands, among
other acts.81
It is difficult, however, to predict how a court would resolve
Japan’s argument. First, a scarcity of authority renders the precise
contours of the doctrine of occupation circa 1895 unclear. Prominent treatises of the time offered only general descriptions of its
requirements,82 and there were no international tribunals to offer
further guidance.83 While modern international courts have
applied the doctrine in a number of cases, such precedent is
unhelpful to the extent that it reflects understandings that had not
yet developed by 1895. Without knowing the specific contours of
the doctrine, it is hard to know whether the Chinese acts were
sufficient.
Second, even if the nineteenth century doctrine of occupation is
identical to its twentieth and twenty-first century counterparts, it
can be risky to draw lessons from precedent. Because stare decisis
does not apply to ICJ decisions,84 the court would not have to follow even its own prior opinions in deciding sovereignty over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu. Additionally, the analysis on whether a particular volume of effectivités is sufficient to create an effective occupa-

80. Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), 2002 I.C.J.
625, 683–85 (Dec. 17).
81. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), 2012 I.C.J. 624, paras. 82–84
(Nov. 19).
82. See, e.g., WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (1880) (explaining that
inchoate title “must either be converted into a definitive title within reasonable time by
planting settlements or military posts, or it must at least be kept alive by repeated local acts
showing an intention of continual claim”); CREASY, supra note 73, at 216 (explaining that
inchoate title through discovery must be followed by use and occupancy to create
sovereignty).
83. See The Court: History, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?
p1=1&p2=1 (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) (summarizing the history of the international judicial system, including the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1899, several
years after Japan annexed the Senkakus).
84. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055.
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tion is so highly contextualized that even minor variations in the
facts can make a difference in the outcome.85
Finally, even insofar as it is safe to seek guidance from precedent, some international tribunals have suggested that very little
may be necessary to establish sovereignty over small, uninhabited
islands.86 Perhaps the most robust illustration of this point comes
from The Clipperton Island Case, where the arbitrator held that
France had effectively occupied an otherwise unclaimed island
merely by sending a French naval officer who landed there and
publicly proclaimed French sovereignty.87 Based on this precedent, China probably did enough even in the nineteenth century.
Moreover, given the size of the Senkaku/Diaoyu, the argument
that China could not have done much more carries some appeal.
Together, these sources of uncertainty suggest that neither side’s
position on the status of the Islands in 1895 is full-proof.
B.

Whether Japan Acquired Title Under the Doctrine of
Acquisitive Prescription

The second critical debate concerns whether Japan acquired
title to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by exercising effective control
over them. As explained earlier, the doctrine of acquisitive prescription enables one state to obtain title over part of the territory
of another by asserting effective control in a peaceful and public
manner, without interruption, for a sufficient period.88 Here,
there probably cannot be a single period of control spanning from
1895 to 1970. Instead, there appears to be two distinct periods during which Japan may have acquired sovereignty under the doctrine: from 1895 to 1937, and from 1951 to 1970. The gap between
them reflects two historical facts. First, Japan was at war with China
from 1937 to 1945.89 The state of war makes it difficult to conclude
that Japan’s control was peaceful—even though the parties did not
fight a battle specifically over the Senkaku/Diaoyu, aggression
toward China during the period facilitated Japan’s effective control
85. See Peter N. Upton, International Law and the Sino-Japanese Controversy over Territorial
Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, 52 B.U. L. REV. 763, 769 (1972).
86. E.g., Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53, at 28 (Apr. 5) (“[T]he tribunal has been satisfied with very little in the way of the
actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not make out a
superior claim. This is particularly true in the case of claims to sovereignty over areas in
thinly populated or unsettled countries.”).
87. Clipperton Island (Fr. v. Mex.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1105 (1932).
88. Supra text accompanying notes 61–62.
89. Diana Lary, China and Japan at War: Suffering and Survival, 1937–1945, ASIA-PAC. J.:
JAPAN FOCUS (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Diana-Lary/3449.
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over the Islands by distracting China with more pressing security
matters and virtually eliminating the possibility of a Chinese challenge.90 I will assume, therefore, that Japan’s effectivités during the
war years cannot count toward Japanese title. Second, as discussed
below in Section C, Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration
in the 1945 Instrument of Surrender dictates that there was an
interregnum during which Japanese sovereignty, if it existed,
depended upon a supporting, post-war determination from the
Allies.91 The years from 1945 to 1951 were a period of limbo, during which Japan had agreed that its sovereignty over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu would depend upon Allied support, but no Allied decision
had been made.92
The absence of clear doctrinal contours complicates the analysis
of whether Japan satisfied the requirements for acquisitive prescription during either of the two periods. For example, “there is a
complete lack of agreement as to the time required for the establishment of a prescriptive title.”93 Hugo Grotius favored a requirement of more than 100 years,94 while Dudley Field argued for 50
years.95 Meanwhile, cases from international tribunals suggest that
states might accomplish acquisitive prescription in a much shorter
period. The Island of Palmas Case explained that possession must
simply last “long enough to enable any Power who might have considered herself as possessing sovereignty over the island . . . to have,
according to local conditions, a reasonable possibility for ascertaining the existence of a state of things contrary to her real or alleged
rights.”96 In The Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau
Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), the
ICJ held that Singapore acquired title from Malaysia over certain
disputed rocks largely because of a combination of Singaporean
effective control and Malaysiaian acquiescence over a period of

90. See Erza F. Vogel, Preface: Regional Patterns in the China War, 1937–1945, in CHINA
WAR: REGIONS OF CHINA, 1937–1945, at xi, xi (MacKinnon et al. eds., 2007) (“The China
War brought the conflict to all major regions of the country over a long period of time and
resulted in tens of millions of casualties. During the China War, death and destruction
were on a scale beyond anything the Chinese had ever experienced . . . .”).
91. Infra text accompanying notes 119–21.
92. Infra text accompanying notes 119–21.
93. Johnson, supra note 61, at 347.
94. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 113 (A.C. Campbell trans., M.
Walter Dunne 1901) (1625).
95. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, OUTLINES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CODE 22 (2d ed. 1876).
96. Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 867 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
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slightly less than thirty years.97 There is simply no established rule
on duration.
The law is also unclear about the volume of effectivités necessary
to support prescriptive title. Like the doctrine of occupation,
acquisitive prescription calls for an analysis that considers the totality of the circumstances in each case.98 The result is that small
changes in the facts can make a difference in the outcome, and the
precedent is generally less helpful. Adding to the uncertainty, only
a few international decisions have actually applied the doctrine.
The most recent is The Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca,
where the ICJ found that, given rather clear Malaysian acquiescence, Singapore had acquired title from Malaysia by investigating
and reporting on maritime hazards and shipwrecks in the waters
surrounding a disputed island, exercising exclusive control over
visits, installing radio communications equipment for use by its
naval forces, and soliciting bids from private entities to reclaim
areas around the island.99 In contrast, The Case Concerning Kasikili/
Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) held that one military patrol in a
disputed territory, publication of certain maps, and conduct of private individuals were insufficient to create prescriptive title for
Namibia.100 In The Case Concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier
Land (Belgium/Netherlands), the ICJ concluded that the Netherlands
failed to acquire prescriptive title from Belgium by collecting taxes
from the disputed plots of land; adjudicating a dispute over a proposed sale of land that included the plots; and selling, applying its
rent laws to, and granting a railway concession that traversed part
of the land.101 These acts were insufficient to displace Belgian sovereignty in part because they were “largely of a routine and administrative character.”102 Other cases have rejected claims to
97. Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malay./Sing.), 2008 I.C.J. 14, 87–88, 96 (May 23).
98. MALCOLM NATHAN SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 426–28 (2003).
99. 2008 I.C.J. at 82–88; see also Coalter G. Lathrop, International Decisions: Sovereignty
over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 834
n.14 (2008) (explaining that the court did not mention “acquisitive prescription, it is difficult to see the difference between the Court’s ‘conduct/acquiescence’ formulation and
garden variety prescription: acquiescence requires publicity, and persistence of conduct
seems to be implied. In any event, the three modes (tacit agreement, acquiescence, and
prescription) are quite similar”).
100. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1103–06 (Dec. 13).
101. Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209, 227–30
(June 20).
102. Id. at 229.
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prescriptive title without addressing the sufficiency of a party’s
administrative acts.103
Despite these uncertainties, Japan has a good argument for prescriptive title, both from 1895 to 1937 and from 1951 to 1970. For
starters, the periods of Japan’s effective control meet multiple variants of the durational requirement. If, as The Island of Palmas Case
suggests, effective control is sufficient where it lasts long enough
simply to provide the opposing party with an adequate opportunity
to recognize it,104 then the periods of 1895 to 1937 and 1951 to
1970 were both more than enough. Indeed, China not only had
ample opportunity to identify Japan’s effective control, China was
in fact aware of Japan’s control of the Islands for decades.105 If, on
the other hand, the law requires that the control exceeds a certain
minimum number of years, then there is still reason to believe that
the duration of Japanese control was sufficient. Spanning over
forty years, Japan’s control from 1895 to 1937 lasted longer than
Singapore’s control over the disputed rocks in The Case Concerning
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca by more than a decade.106 And there
does not seem to be a meaningful difference between the period
found sufficient in the Pedra Branca case107 and the approximately
nineteen years of Japan’s control from 1951 to 1970. On balance,
international case law suggests that the duration of Japan’s control
was enough for each period.
There is also a good argument that Japan’s effectivités were sufficient in both quality and volume during each period. Between
1895 and 1937, the Japanese government officially claimed several
of the Islands; conducted detailed surveys and entered the Islands
into official land registries; leased most of the Islands to Koga Tatsushiro, a Japanese citizen, for thirty years; granted an official
award to Mr. Koga for developing the Islands; and then sold most
103. See, e.g., Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon/Nigeria), 2002 I.C.J. 303, 412–16 (Oct. 10) (rejecting a Nigerian claim to prescriptive
title because Nigeria did not consider itself to have title during the relevant period and
Cameroon had not acquiesced); Chamizal (Mex./U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 309, 328–29 (1911)
(rejecting a claim of prescriptive title because possession by the United States had been
interrupted repeatedly by challenges from Mexican diplomatic agents).
104. Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 867 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
105. See infra notes 113–115 and accompanying text (describing Chinese knowledge of
and acquiescence to sovereign acts by Japan at the Islands).
106. See Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South
Ledge (Malay./Sing.), 2008 I.C.J. 14, 88 (May 23) (assuming that Singapore’s proposal for
reclamation around the island in 1978 is the start of its control until the case was submitted
to the ICJ in 2008).
107. See Lathrop, supra note 99, at 832–33 (finding effective control over a period of
twenty-seven years sufficient to establish sovereignty).
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of the Islands to the Koga family.108 Later, between 1951 and 1970,
Japan required Taiwanese workers to leave the Senkaku/Diaoyu on
two occasions upon finding that they did not have passports or
immigration permits, placed on the Islands a marker that identified them as Japanese territory, and authorized payments of compensation to families of victims attacked by two unidentified vessels
in the surrounding waters.109 Additionally, acting on the premise
of Japan’s residual sovereignty, the United States used the Islands
for military purposes starting in the 1950s.110 These acts appear
more similar in quality and volume to those that supported Singapore’s successful claim to prescriptive title in the Pedra Branca
case111 than to those that failed to establish title with Namibia in
the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case.112
Equally significant is that China apparently did nothing to exert
effective control over the Islands or even protest Japanese control
during the periods in question.113 In fact, China affirmatively
endorsed Japanese sovereignty on multiple occasions. In 1920, the
Chinese consul in Nagasaki issued a letter expressing appreciation
to a Japanese citizen for rescuing a number of Chinese fishermen
who had been stranded on the Islands after a storm and in doing
so referred to the Senkaku/Diaoyu as part of “Yaeyama District,
Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan.”114 Later, in 1953, the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of
China, published an article defining the Senkaku/Diaoyu as part
of the Ryukyu Islands and urging the United States to return them
to Japan.115 China also acknowledged Japanese sovereignty in offi108. Gavan McCormack, Much Ado over Small Islands: The Sino-Japanese Confrontation over
the Senkaku/Diaoyu, ASIA-PAC. J.: JAPAN FOCUS (May 27, 2013), http://www.japanfocus.org/
site/make_pdf/3947; Han-yi Shaw, supra note 51, at 32; Tao Cheng, supra note 1, at 247.
109. Han-yi Shaw, supra note 51, at 13, 34; Tao Cheng, supra note 1, at 246–47.
110. LARRY A. NIKSCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV, CRS-96-798, SENKAKU (DIAOYU) ISLANDS
DISPUTE: THE U.S. LEGAL RELATIONSHIP AND OBLIGATIONS 3 (1996).
111. See supra text accompanying note 99.
112. See supra text accompanying note 100.
113. The following explains:
Not until the discovery of oil around the Diaoyu Islands in 1969 did both the
Nationalist Chinese regime in Taiwan and the Communist Chinese Regime on
the mainland officially claim ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. . . . [T]he Chinese
conducted no activities in the East China Sea, including the Diaoyu Islands, after
the [Ryukyu] Kingdom was annexed by the Japanese in 1879, except with regard
to Taiwan, which was ceded to Japan after 1895.
See SUGANUMA, supra note 68, at 116, 119.
114. Han-yi Shaw, supra note 51, at 33.
115. See Takayuki Nishi, The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: A Japanese Scholar Responds, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2012, http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/the-diaoyusenkakuislands-a-japanese-scholar-responds.
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cial maps and textbooks for decades116 and did not enact a law
including the Islands in Chinese territory until 1992.117 Cumulatively, these acts demonstrate Chinese acquiescence to Japanese
sovereignty at least as clearly as others that international courts
have found sufficient to support prescriptive title in comparable
cases.118 Acquisitive prescription thus provides a basis for resolving
the case in favor of Japan.
C.

Whether the Allies Made a Determination in Favor of Japanese Title
After World War II

The final critical debate concerns whether the Allies ever made a
determination in favor of Japanese title over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands in accordance with the 1945 Potsdam Declaration and
Instrument of Surrender. At Potsdam, the United States, China,
and the United Kingdom proclaimed in part, “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such other minor islands as we determine.”119
This declaration became binding upon Japan when Japan
“accept[ed]” its provisions and “undert[ook] . . . to carry [them]
out . . . in good faith” in the Instrument of Surrender.120
The parties have raised a number of arguments about these
texts. China argues that the Allies never made the necessary determination in favor of Japan and instead favored Chinese sovereignty
by issuing the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Declaration.121 The former proclaimed that “all the territories Japan has
stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pes116. See Shinya Murase, Japan Chair Platform: The Senkaku Islands and International Law,
CSIS (May 22, 2013), http://csis.org/publication/japan-chair-platform-senkaku-islandsand-international-law; see also SUGANUMA, supra note 68, at 125–27 (describing a number of
official Chinese publications that omitted the Senkaku/Diaoyu in delimiting Chinese
territory).
117. Asahi Shimbun, Until Now: Tensions Start to Rise When China Enacts Law Claiming
Islands, ASIA & JAPAN WATCH (Dec. 26, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/special/
senkaku_history/AJ201212260105.
118. Cf. Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South
Ledge (Malay./Sing.), 2008 I.C.J. 14, 82–88 (May 23).
119. Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, 13 DEP’T ST. BULL. 137,
para. 8 (1945) [hereinafter Potsdam Declaration].
120. Instrument of Surrender of Japan, at 1251–52, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 Stat. 1733; see also
YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND ITS INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
35–36 (2009) (noting that the instrument of surrender incorporated the Potsdam
Declaration).
121. See State Council Info. Office of China, supra note 6.
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cadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China,”122 while the
latter provided that the Cairo Declaration “shall be carried out.”123
Japan responds that the Cairo Declaration does not apply because
the Islands were unoccupied terra nullius at the time of annexation
and thus never “stolen” from China.124 Further, Japan contends
that the Allies made the necessary determination in favor of Japanese sovereignty in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which
provided that “Japan will concur in any proposal of the United
States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system
. . . Nansei Shoto south of 29 deg. north latitude (including the
Ryukyu Islands . . . .),”125 and required Japan to renounce sovereignty over islands such as Formosa, the Spratly Islands, and the
Paracel Islands.126 Japan asserts that the Treaty embodied the necessary Allied determination because the Senkaku/Diaoyu are part
of “Nansei Shoto south of 29 deg. north latitude (including the
Ryukyu Islands . . .)”; the Treaty required the concurrence of
Japan, rather than China, in any proposal to place the Ryukyu
Islands under U.N. trusteeship; and the Treaty required a renunciation of Japanese sovereignty over a number of specific islands
while conspicuously omitting any requirement of a renunciation of
sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu.127 China replies that the San
Francisco Treaty did not place the Islands under U.S. trusteeship
and therefore did not favor Japanese sovereignty and that the
Treaty is illegal even if it purported to grant the Islands to Japan,
given that China did not participate in its negotiation or
adoption.128
The most important point about these texts is that their relevance is conditional. Start with the Cairo Declaration. The purpose of that document was to announce the Allies’ intention to
simply undo Japan’s military conquests by ordering the return of
territories stolen from China rather than to punish Japan by taking
away territories that rightfully belonged to it. The Allies stated
explicitly that they “covet[ed] no gain for themselves and ha[d] no
thought of territorial expansion.”129 Thus, to say that the Cairo
122. Conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime
Minister Churchill in North Africa, 9 DEP’T ST. BULL. 393, 393 (1943) [hereinafter Cairo
Declaration].
123. Potsdam Declaration, supra note 119, art. 8.
124. See The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, supra note 5.
125. Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 3, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 145.
126. Id. art. 2.
127. Id. art. 2.
128. State Council Info. Office of China, supra note 6.
129. Cairo Declaration, supra note 122, at 393.
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Declaration supports the Chinese claim is to presuppose that the
Senkaku/Diaoyu belonged to China up until the time of Japanese
annexation in 1895, that Japan’s annexation was therefore illegal,
and that Japan did not acquire title under the doctrine of acquisitive prescription from 1895 to 1937. Put differently, if China did
not have title in 1895, or if China acquiesced to Japanese control
before World War II, then Japan did not steal the Islands and Cairo
simply does not apply. Indeed, under this latter scenario, a Chinese claim to the Islands in 1943 would have contradicted the
Allies’ express disavowal of territorial expansion.130 The Cairo
Declaration, therefore, cannot operate as a freestanding basis for
Chinese sovereignty. The same is true of the Potsdam Declaration,
which did not affirmatively support Chinese sovereignty over any
territory other than by calling for the enforcement of the Cairo
Declaration.131 To treat Potsdam as affirmative evidence of Chinese title is again to presuppose that the Senkaku/Diaoyu
belonged to China in 1895, that Japan’s annexation was unlawful,
and that Japan did not acquire prescriptive title prior to Cairo.
The San Francisco Treaty also holds only conditional relevance.
To understand why, first consider the Treaty’s plain meaning. Several inferences can be drawn from the text. First, because “Nansei
Shoto” translates to “Southwest Archipelago,” “Nansei Shoto south
of 29 deg. north latitude” refers simply to that portion of the archipelago that is south of twenty-nine degrees North latitude—essentially everything below Takarajima Island, which is approximately
140 nautical miles southwest of Kagoshima Prefecture (see Figure
8).132 Second, whether the Senkaku/Diaoyu are part of “Nansei
Shoto south of 29 deg. north latitude” hinges on natural geography. The text supports this conclusion by referring to a line of
latitude and an island chain rather than, for example, “Okinawa
Prefecture” or some other political unit.133 In this way, the San
Francisco Treaty is reminiscent of the natural geographic orientation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki’s language on Formosa. Third,
the use of the Japanese term, “Nansei Shoto,” rather than its
English translation, in the midst of an English text suggests that
Japanese meaning and usage determine the scope of the
archipelago.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 125, art. 8.
Distance Measurement Tool, supra note 15.
Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 125, art. 3.
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FIGURE 8

Given these observations, it seems indisputable that the San
Francisco Treaty at least purported to allocate sovereignty to Japan,
as long as Japanese usage in 1951 defined “Nansei Shoto” as including the Senkaku/Diaoyu. Because the Islands are at twenty-five
degrees North latitude, they satisfy the text’s latitudinal requirement.134 Moreover, it would be strange to require only the concurrence of Japan in U.N. trusteeship over the southern part of Nansei
Shoto if there were an understanding that the PRC or ROC had
sovereignty over some portion of the archipelago. Finally, under
the widely utilized expressio unius canon, the provisions requiring
Japan to renounce sovereignty only over islands such as Formosa,
the Spratly Islands, and the Paracel Islands imply that Japan did
not have to renounce sovereignty over islands not mentioned, such
as the Senkaku/Diaoyu.
Subsequent conduct of the United States corroborates this interpretation.135 The official U.S. position immediately after San Francisco was that while the Treaty gave to the United States
administrative authority over the southern part of Nansei Shoto,
Japan retained “residual sovereignty.”136 Moreover, U.S. actions
left no doubt that U.S. administrative authority covered the dis134. Id.
135. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 31, art. 31.3(b) (providing that treaty interpretation shall take into account “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation”).
136. See Okinawa Reversion Treaty, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 92-10, at 1 (1971) (explaining
that this position “was reaffirmed by all subsequent Administrations”); Office of Ne. Asian
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puted islands. In 1953, the U.S. Army issued Civil Administration
Proclamation (USCAR) Number 27, which provided that the “territorial Jurisdiction of the United States Civil Administration of the
Ryukyu Islands, and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands are
redesignated as all of those islands, islets, atolls and rocks and territorial waters within” geographic boundaries that plainly encircled
the Senkaku/Diaoyu.137 Significantly, this proclamation came only
a year and a half after the San Francisco Treaty entered into force
and implemented U.S. trusteeship “in conformity with” the
Treaty.138 And the U.S. Navy used the Islands as bombing ranges
starting in the 1950s.139 As long as U.S. administration was coterminous with Japan’s residual sovereignty, the obvious implication
of the American conduct is that the United States, a key participant
in the drafting process, understood the Treaty to leave Japan with
residual sovereignty over the disputed islands.
China might contend that the Allies violated the Potsdam Declaration by affirming Japanese sovereignty over the Islands in the San
Francisco Treaty without first obtaining Chinese consent. This
argument seems unpersuasive, however. One reason is that the
Declaration was extremely vague about process; it did not specify
when, where, or how the Allies envisioned making their determinations.140 The text does not state, for example, whether the Allies
planned to determine sovereignty over minor islands by unanimous agreement or something less. Given this vagueness, it is hard
to say that the determination reflected in the San Francisco Treaty
violated Potsdam. Further, even if Potsdam had been clear about
process, the Declaration was in itself nonbinding because it was not
a treaty.141 While Japan’s acceptance of Potsdam created a legal
Affairs, Dep’t of State, United States Relations with Japan, 1945–1952, in JAPAN AND AMERICA
TODAY 33, 49–50 (1953).
137. U.S. Civil Admin. of the Ryukyu Islands, Civil Administration Proclamation No. 27:
Geographical Boundaries of the Ryukyu Islands, RYUKYU-OKINAWA HISTORY & CULTURE WEBSITE
art. 1 (Dec. 25, 1953), http://www.niraikanai.wwma.net/pages/archive/caproc27.html.
138. Id.
139. NIKSCH, supra note 110, at 4.
140. Potsdam Declaration, supra note 119, art. 8.
141. See, e.g., Lung-chu Chen & W.M. Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title, 81 YALE L.J. 599, 635 (1972) (“The Cairo Declaration is not, in the formal sense,
a ‘legal’ document. It was not ratified and, indeed, the missions of the three declarants
probably did not have authorizations to conclude a policy revision of such scope.”); E.
Lauterpacht, The Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law—
Survey and Comment, 8 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 146, 186–87 (1959) (explaining that the Cairo
Declaration is “not couched in the form of a legal instrument,” and that it is “doubtful”
that the Potsdam Declaration was intended to create binding obligations between the signatories); Statement by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 536 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
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relationship between Japan and the Allies, the Allies had no legal
obligations to one another to adhere to the Declaration’s terms.142
Even if China understood the Declaration to require the Allies to
agree unanimously in determining Japanese sovereignty over any
minor islands, that document did not impose upon the United
States and the United Kingdom a legal obligation to honor that
understanding.143 Thus, if the Senkaku/Diaoyu did not belong to
China, the United States and the United Kingdom remained free
to support Japanese title to those islands even over a Chinese objection, including in the San Francisco Treaty.
China also contends, however, that the Allies violated the fundamental principles of sovereign equality and independence by
granting Japanese sovereignty over the Islands in the San Francisco
Treaty without Chinese approval.144 The U.N. Charter codified
those principles several years before San Francisco145 and, in doing
so, barred states from taking territory away from a third-party state
without that party’s consent.146 Because of these principles, the
legality of the Treaty’s treatment of the Senkaku/Diaoyu must
assume either that China consented to Japanese title over the
Islands or that Chinese consent was unnecessary because the
Islands were not Chinese territory in 1951.
Addressing these assumptions in order, China probably did not
consent to the relevant part of the Treaty. On the one hand, the
ROC explicitly recognized the legality of at least parts of the San
Francisco Treaty in several provisions of the Treaty of Taipei. Specifically, the ROC “recognized that under Article 2 of the [San
Francisco Treaty], Japan . . . renounced all right, title, and claim to
Taiwan . . . and [the Pescadores] as well as the Spratly Islands and
the Paracel Islands”; “recognized that under the provisions of Article 10 of the San Francisco Treaty, Japan has renounced all special
rights and its interests in China”; and agreed that, unless otherwise
provided, “any problem arising between the Republic of China and
(1955) 900-2 (U.K.) (explaining that the declaration was nonbinding and “contained
merely a statement of common purpose”).
142. Cf. Chen & Reisman, supra note 141, at 635; Lauterpacht, supra note 141, at
186–87; Statement by Prime Minster Winston Churchill, supra note 141.
143. Chen & Reisman, supra note 141, at 635; Lauterpacht, supra note 141, at 186–87;
Statement by Prime Minster Winston Churchill, supra note 141.
144. State Council Info. Office of China, supra note 6.
145. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.
146. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 31, art. 35 (“An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the
provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third State expressly
accepts that obligation in writing.”).
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Japan as a result of the existence of a state of war shall be settled in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the San Francisco
Treaty.”147 If these provisions reflect a general acceptance of San
Francisco by the ROC, and if the ROC was the legitimate government of China at the time, then they cure the absence of Chinese
participation in San Francisco’s negotiation and adoption. On the
other hand, neither the PRC nor the ROC consented through the
usual means of signature; the ROC’s historical capacity to act for
China is itself a notoriously intractable question; and the Treaty of
Taipei neither categorically recognizes San Francisco’s legality nor
specifically recognizes the legality of San Francisco’s key provision
on the Ryukyu Islands.148
The remaining question, then, is whether the absence of Chinese consent matters. Once again, the answer depends on the laws
of occupation and acquisitive prescription. If China updated its
control over the Islands in the nineteenth century to satisfy the
new and more demanding requirements for effective occupation,
and if Japan failed to acquire title through acquisitive prescription
prior to 1951, then the Islands belonged to China at the time of
San Francisco, and the Treaty is unlawful for purporting to grant
title to Japan without Chinese consent.149 If China did not update
its control over the Islands to satisfy the new requirements for
occupation, or if Japan acquired title through prescription before
1951, then Chinese consent was unnecessary and San Francisco
embodies a valid Allied determination in favor of Japanese sovereignty in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and Instrument
of Surrender. Just as the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations favor
Chinese sovereignty only if we assume that China prevails on the
questions of early occupation and prewar acquisitive prescription,
the San Francisco Treaty favors Japanese sovereignty only if we
assume that Japan prevails on those same questions. The only difference is that Japan does not need to prevail on both questions in
147. Treaty of Peace, Taiwan-Japan, supra note 7, arts. 2, 5, 11.
148. For the Treaty of Taipei to reflect a general acceptance of San Francisco’s territorial settlements, one would have to conclude that, by agreeing in Article 11 to resolve
problems arising between the ROC and Japan “as a result of the existence of a state of war”
in accordance with the “relevant” provisions of the San Francisco Treaty, the ROC agreed
to settle the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute in accordance with the Ryukyu Islands provision in
San Francisco’s Article 3. But Japan is unlikely to assert that the source of the islands
dispute was war, and interpreting Article 11 as a general ROC recognition of San Francisco’s legality would mean that the ROC’s specific recognition of Articles 2 and 10 was
redundant.
149. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para.1.
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order for the Treaty to favor the Japanese claim—either will
suffice.
In summary, we know from the Instrument of Surrender that
Japan agreed its sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
would depend upon the occurrence of a supporting determination
from the Allies after World War II. However, whether a valid determination was made hinges on one’s resolution of the arguments
on occupation and acquisitive prescription. Given the preceding
conclusions on acquisitive prescription in Section B, this framework suggests that the San Francisco Treaty was lawful—because
China acquiesced to Japan’s effective control over the Islands from
1895 to 1937, title shifted to Japan prior to San Francisco, and Chinese consent to the Treaty was unnecessary.150 This conclusion follows regardless of one’s view on the question of nineteenth century
occupation.
III.

IMPLICATIONS

Upon close inspection, the legal analysis on the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is not terribly complicated.
Many of the issues that have arisen in the debates simply do not
matter from a legal standpoint. These include the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China’s 1941 declaration of war, geography, acts of private
individuals, and most official acts after 1970. The only important
questions are (1) whether the Islands were terra nullius in 1895, (2)
whether Japan acquired title through acquisitive prescription, and
(3) whether the Allies ever made a valid determination in favor of
Japanese sovereignty after World War II, in satisfaction of the Potsdam Declaration and Instrument of Surrender. Of these, the first
two questions are the most important because they dictate the resolution of the third.
Framing the dispute in this manner helps to impose conceptual
order on a legal debate that has, at times, suffered from a certain
level of analytical chaos. The essential predicates for the contemporary Chinese claim are original Chinese occupation and the
absence of Japanese prescriptive title. If the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands were Chinese territory in 1895 and Japan did not acquire
title by prescription from 1895 to 1937, then: (1) Japan “stole[ ]”
the Islands within the meaning of the Cairo Declaration and later
accepted a legal obligation to return them to China by signing the
Instrument of Surrender; (2) the San Francisco Treaty could not
150. See supra notes 104–14 and accompanying text.
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have granted sovereignty to Japan because Chinese consent was
necessary but never obtained; and (3) Japan has title today only if it
satisfied the requirements for acquisitive prescription between
1951 and 1970. If, on the other hand, the Islands were not Chinese territory in 1895, or if Japan acquired prescriptive title from
1895 to 1937, then Japan did not steal the Islands within the meaning of the Cairo Declaration or accept an obligation to return them
by signing the Instrument of Surrender, and the San Francisco
Treaty’s affirmation of Japanese sovereignty was lawful regardless
of Chinese consent. It is that simple.
For Japan, the Potsdam Declaration and Instrument of Surrender loom large. Recall that in accepting Potsdam, Japan agreed
that its title to any “minor islands”—including the Senkaku/
Diaoyu—would depend on the occurrence of a supporting, Allied
determination following World War II.151 The result of that agreement is that Japan’s prewar title, even if originally valid, cannot be
the foundation for Japanese sovereignty today. If Japan has sovereignty now, it must be because of something that happened after
the Instrument of Surrender. This means that Japan’s incentive
for arguing that the Islands were terra nullius in 1895 is not to prove
that prewar occupation itself establishes a contemporary Japanese
title, but rather to undermine China’s claim and thus set up the
argument that Chinese consent to the San Francisco Treaty was
unnecessary. The same is true of the argument that Japan
acquired prescriptive title from 1895 to 1937. Just as the nineteenth century occupation is indispensable for China, either postwar acquisitive prescription or a lawful San Francisco settlement is
essential for Japan.
Operating under this analytical structure in turn clarifies that
Japan has the better argument. One reason is that Japan simply
has more doctrinal options. China has title only if it establishes the
nineteenth century Chinese occupation and the absence of prescriptive title for Japan.152 Japan, by contrast, can prevail if it establishes either that China lost or never had prewar title and the San
Francisco Treaty conferred sovereignty on Japan, or that Japanese
effective control satisfied the requirements for acquisitive prescription from 1951 to 1970.153 In part, this is because, as a later-in-time
source of title, acquisitive prescription trumps original occupation—the doctrine in fact assumes an original Chinese sovereignty.
151. See supra text accompanying note 127.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68.
153. See supra text accompanying note 76, 103–07; supra Part II.C.
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In part, it is also because the law rewards effective control, which
Japan exercised exclusively throughout the twentieth century.154
Japan also has the better argument because its effective control
satisfied the requirements for acquisitive prescription at least as
clearly as China’s nineteenth century effectivités satisfied the
requirements for occupation. The evidence of Japan’s effective
control is simply more substantial; the various evidence of affirmative Chinese acquiescence to and even support for that control is
damning; and while there is a certain amount of indeterminacy in
the doctrine of acquisitive prescription, this indeterminacy is no
greater than that associated with the historical law of occupation.
Those who manage to find a nineteenth-century Chinese occupation of the Islands notwithstanding substantial indeterminacy
demonstrate a tolerance for rule uncertainty that disqualifies them
from arguing that indeterminacy precludes a finding of prescriptive title for Japan. The absence of clear rules, moreover, does not
justify the avoidance of ultimate conclusions. After all, international tribunals have resolved numerous disputes of a similar
nature based on the very same doctrines.155 The question is not
whether there is a clear answer, but whether there is a best answer.
And here there is: sovereignty belongs to Japan.
A final implication of the analysis is that additional historical
research might help reduce some of the legal indeterminacy. For
example, evidence of the date of the first bathymetric surveys of
the East China Sea could help to confirm whether the Senkaku/
Diaoyu appertained or belonged to Formosa156 within the meaning
of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. If no surveys occurred prior to 1895,
then the parties could not have possessed detailed knowledge of
seabed topography and it is implausible that they envisioned seabed features as the criterion by which to determine the scope of
the ceded territory. Eliminating the possibility of this criterion
would in turn establish that distance—the only plausible, remaining natural geographic option—determines whether the Senkaku/
Diaoyu appertain or belong to Formosa under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Additionally, evidence of the meaning of “Nansei Shoto”
within Japanese usage circa 1951 would help to clarify the meaning
of the San Francisco Treaty. If standard usage of that term encom154. See, e.g., Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 854 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928);
see generally Hajime, supra note 43.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 73–74, 106.
156. Treaty of Peace, China-Japan, supra note 4, art. 2(b).
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passed the disputed Islands, there can be no debate that the Treaty
purported to establish Japanese sovereignty.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has
generated heated debate from officials and observers on both
sides. A number of works in the recent American legal literature,
however, have raised irrelevant issues and elided important doctrinal details in siding with the Chinese claim. This Article is meant
as a counterpoint to those analyses. The argument is that, fundamentally, the dispute hinges on the doctrines of occupation and
acquisitive prescription and that Japan has a more persuasive claim
because Japan has more doctrinal options in pressing its case—the
argument for acquisitive prescription is at least as powerful as the
argument for original Chinese occupation, and acquisitive prescription trumps occupation as a later-in-time source of title.
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